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The Public Health Implications
of Religious Exemptions: A
Balance Between Public Safety
and Personal Choice, or Religion
Gone Too Far?
Christopher Ogolla†
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death.1
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Introduction
Religion has historically influenced public health.2 It has, and does
continue to play, both a positive and a negative role in population
health. On the positive side, the evidence suggests that religion,
however assessed, is generally a protective factor for mental illness.3
In behavioral health, vegetarian diets required by many Hindu,
Seventh Day Adventists, and Buddhist religions, among others, “have
been found to be associated with decreased risk of heart disease.”4
Additionally, in religions where smoking and drinking are prohibited
(such as among the Mormons of Utah), “epidemiological maps of the
incidence of lung cancer and liver disease show markedly low rates of
occurrence.”5
In many parts of the world, religious organizations and groups
provide key public health functions including, but not limited to,
provision of good nutrition, HIV treatment and counseling services,
clean drinking water, childhood immunizations, and prenatal and
neonatal health screening services. Here in the United States, faithbased organizations have always been very active in the public health
arena. Indeed, the Department of Health and Human Services has
established a Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
whose goal is to “lead the department’s efforts to build and support
partnerships with faith-based and community organizations in order
to better serve individuals, families and communities in need.”6 These
positives do not conflict with any laws.
On the other hand, religion has had some significant negative
influences on public health. For example, many religious groups’
opposition to the use of condoms in the developing world has been
2.

Peter H. Van Ness, Religion and Public Health, 38 J. RELIGION &
HEALTH 15, 17 (1999).

3.

Jeff Levin, Religion and Mental Health: Theory and Research, INT’L J.
APPL. PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES 1, 10 (2010).

4.

Van Ness, supra note 2, at 17.

5.

Id.

6.

The Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, U.S. DEP’T.
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/partnerships (last
visited Jan. 27, 2014).
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associated with the increased spread of HIV and AIDS.7 Other
denominations like Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s Witnesses
restrict members’ use of medical services.8 Between 2000 and 2002,
New York City public health officials reported that a total of eleven
newborn males had laboratory-confirmed herpes simplex virus (HSV)
infections in the weeks following out-of-hospital Jewish ritual
circumcision. Ten of the eleven newborns were hospitalized and two
died.9
Thus, it can be argued that to a great extent, religion and public
health activities are inextricably intertwined. However, the
constitutional relationship between the two is inordinately complex.
Several constitutional rights are relevant to public health practice.
Most common are the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”10 In the words of Justice
Hugo Black:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance.11

The first clause, or the Establishment Clause, “prohibits
government actions that unduly favor one religion over another. It

7.

Burundi: Religious Leaders’ Resistance to Condom Hurts HIV Fight,
(May
26,
2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/92817/Burundi-religious-leadersresistance-to-condoms-hurts-hiv-fight.

IRINNEWS.ORG

8.

Van Ness, supra note 2, at 18.

9.

Susan Blank et al., Neonatal Herpes Simplex Virus Infection Following
Jewish Ritual Circumcisions that Included Direct Orogenital Suction –
New York City, 2000–2011, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
405 (2012).

10.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

11.

Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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also prohibits the government from unduly preferring religion over
non-religion, or non-religion over religion.”12
There are concerns in public health that “[e]xemptions—religious
or otherwise—are dangerous and put individuals at risk for
contracting potentially debilitating and deadly infectious diseases.”13
The availability of religious exemptions in public health has pitted
public health practitioners against those opposed to public health
mandates such as those in immunization, contraception, quarantine,
and isolation. For example, those against religious exemptions in
public health contend that the First Amendment neither requires that
states provide a religious exemption from immunization nor does it
require that states provide religious accommodations with respect to
immunization statutes.14 Additionally, they argue that “statutory
religious exemption improperly advances religion because its essential
effect is to entitle those holding a religious belief against
immunization to be exempted from immunization.”15 Alternatively,
“application of the religious exemption requires excessive
entanglement of state and church.”16 Essentially, these arguments boil
down to the fact that the religious exemptions themselves violate the
Establishment Clause. Another line of criticism decries the strong
privileges the law grants to religion by observing that “[t]here has
been an ongoing religious dialectic between religious entities, the law
and the public good for centuries, and it has tended from strong
privileges for religious entities towards the application of the rule of
law to them.”17 In other words, religion seems to be singled out for
special beneficial treatment.18
12.

Establishment Clause, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/establishment_clause
(last
visited
Aug. 2, 2014).

13.

EVERY CHILD BY TWO, RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FACT SHEET,
http://www.vaccinateyourbaby.org/pdfs/religion_exemptions_fact_she
et.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).

14.

Turner v. Liverpool Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (N.D.N.Y.
2002).

15.

Id. at 192.

16.

Id. at 191.

17.

MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD
LAW 238 (2005).

18.

Professor Steven Smith, a supporter of religious accommodations writes
that “the anti-accommodationist position increasingly finds favor with
legal academics. Why should religion be singled out for special
constitutional treatment? Or at least for special favorable treatment . . .
.” Steven D. Smith & Caroline Marla Corbin, Debate, The
Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
266 (2013).

VS.

THE GAVEL: RELIGION
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Proponents of religious exemptions in public health contend that
“any state inquiry into the nature or sincerity of a proclaimed
religious belief is not driven by a compelling state interest and is
therefore a blatant violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.”19 Others argue that the constitutional right to
contraceptives, recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut20 is a negative liberty, not a positive right.21 They
maintain that the “right created in Griswold was not a positive right
to demand that the government provide or pay for contraceptives,
much less than a right to force healthcare providers to prescribe or
employers to subsidize contraception.”22 By induction, this argument
holds that since the contraception right is a not a positive right, it
cannot be mandated and therefore those opposed to it on religious
grounds should be exempted. Still, others point to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), “which explicitly commands
affirmative accommodation of religion . . . .”23 RFRA, in turn, came
about after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon. v. Smith.
In Employment Division v. Smith,24 the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause permitted Oregon to include religiously inspired
peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use
of that drug, and therefore permitted the state to deny unemployment
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such
religiously inspired use.25 In an oft-quoted phrase regarding the
constitutionality of religious exemptions in public or state activities
(read public health activities), the Court found, “[w]e have never held
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our
19.

Hepatitis B Vaccinations and State Law, RUTHERFORD INST. 4 (2002),
http://www.vaclib.org/letters/B18-RE_1.PDF.
The
Rutherford
Institute is a Charlottesville, VA, based group that provides legal
services in the defense of religious and civil liberties; see David Hudson,
The Establishment Clause Is Still a Contentious Battle Among the
Justices, ABA J., Nov. 2013, at 16.

20.

381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).

21.

Maureen Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and Catholic
Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento: Towards a New
Understanding of Women’s Health, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y., 368, 371
(2005).

22.

Id.

23.

Smith & Corbin, supra note 18, at 266.

24.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

25.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”26 As noted
by the Congressional Research Service, “[t]he Court’s decision lowered
the constitutional baseline of protection, meaning that laws that do
not specifically target religion are not subject to heightened review
under the First Amendment.”27
In response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA in 1993.28 RFRA
provides in pertinent part:
[The g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except only . . . if [the government]
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.29

RFRA “essentially reinstated the heightened standard of
protection applied to government actions that interfered with the free
exercise of religion.”30 However, because of Smith, courts have
generally held that there is no First Amendment free exercise right to
religious exemptions from mandatory public health activities. Yet,
despite this consensus among the courts, forty-eight states statutorily
provide for religious exemptions for school vaccination laws,31 while
twenty-one states offer exemptions from contraceptive coverage

26.

Id. at 878.

27.

CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43329, FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION BY SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR OWNERS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 2 (2014),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43329.pdf.

28.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. Congress responded to Smith by enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb “to
restore the compelling interest test for free-exercise cases that prevailed
prior to Smith and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.” Autocam
Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

29.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (1993).

30.

BROUGHER, supra note 27.

31.

See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATES WITH RELIGIOUS AND
PHILOSOPHICAL
EXEMPTIONS
FROM
SCHOOL
IMMUNIZATION
REQUIREMENTS
(Dec.
2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemptionstate-laws.aspx.
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(usually for religious reasons) for insurers or employers in their
policies.32
The questions then arise; first, do religious exemptions in public
health activities allow the government to unduly prefer religion over
non-religion?33 Second, is immunizing religious conduct consistent
with public welfare, health, and safety?34 Third, are the overwhelming
number of states that provide statutory religious exemptions for
immunizations
(forty-eight)
and
religious
exemptions
for
contraception (approximately half) tipping the balance heavily in
favor of religion? Put otherwise, are these jurisdictions running on
Scylla, wishing to avoid Charybdis?35
This paper attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the
historical, legal, and policy arguments for and against religious
exemptions in public health functions, specifically in vaccination,
contraception, and quarantine and isolation. This article notes that,
although a number of states and localities have statutes, rules, and
regulations mandating immunizations and provision of contraception,
a majority of states have enacted religious refusal clauses essentially
weakening the overall public health goals of the mandates. Part I
reviews the positive and negative roles that religion plays in public
health and argues that exemptions—religious or otherwise—are
dangerous and put individuals at risk for contracting potentially
debilitating and deadly infectious diseases.
Part II describes the history of religious exemptions in public
health noting that (1) they have been around since the early part of
the nineteenth century; (2) that the exemptions are generally offered
for medical, religious, and philosophical grounds; and (3) that there
32.

NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
CONTRACEPTION
LAWS
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-forcontraception-state-laws.aspx.

33.

See KENT GREENWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS, 2 (2006) (“[T]he crucial issue then becomes
whether legislatures or courts should create privileged exceptions that
are based directly on a person’s religious convictions or rest on some
standard, such as “conscience” that includes religious convictions but
does not distinguish between them and similar nonreligious
convictions.”).

34.

HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 8.

35.

Scylla and Charybdis are two monsters in Greek mythology. Scylla attacked
sailors and Charybdis was a dangerous whirlpool at the mouth of the
cave of the sea monster Scylla. To be stuck in between Scylla
and Charybdis forces States between two equally unpleasant options:
Granting religious exemptions hurts public health activities, but denying
those exemptions may trigger free exercise and establishment clause
challenges. Either way, the States are interfering with religion.
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has been strong opposition to both vaccination and contraception.
Nevertheless, great strides have been made in the provision of
contraceptives despite several states having religious exclusions for
their contraceptive equity laws.
Part III discusses contraceptive equity laws in both state and
federal courts and analyzes several cases challenging contraceptive
mandates—in particular, Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. et al. v. Sebelius,36
and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS37—and their disparate
impacts on public health. Part IV discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.,38 and notes that its
holding—that for-profit religious corporations can be considered
persons exercising religion for purposes of the RFRA—does not bode
well for public health. For example, this article argues in this section
that the majority’s view that the government can simply
accommodate for-profit corporations’ religious beliefs by paying for
the contraceptives is unworkable, as argued by Justice Ginsburg in
her dissent.
Part IV discusses isolation and quarantine, noting that a
significant problem with religious exemptions in quarantine and
isolation is that they seem antithetical to science.
Part V addresses the question of whether religious accommodation
is a balance between public safety and personal choice, or religion
gone too far. It avers that overwhelming number of states providing
statutory religious exemptions for immunizations, and those that
provide religious exemptions for contraception, quarantine, and
isolation are tipping the balance heavily in favor of religion.
Part VI offers some recommendations, specifically three
individuals, who though not necessarily addressing religious
exemptions, have done more to advance the goals of public health,
individual rights, and personal autonomy notwithstanding. The paper
concludes by arguing that religious exemptions in public health
activities allow the government to unduly prefer religion over nonreligion, that immunizing religious conduct is not consistent with
public welfare, health, and safety and, finally, that the overwhelming
number of states (forty-eight) providing statutory religious
exemptions for immunizations and the nearly half that provide
exemptions for contraception, are tipping the balance heavily in favor
of religion.

36.

723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).

37.

724 F.3d 377 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d by Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

38.

134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
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I.

History of Religious Exemptions in Public Health
Activities
A. Vaccinations

Religious exemptions have been around since the early part of the
nineteenth century. In public health, exemptions are generally offered
for medical, religious, or philosophical reasons.39 A religious exemption
is a statutory provision that allows parents to exempt their children
from vaccination if vaccination contradicts their sincere religious
beliefs.40 It can also mean exemption from any public health activity
based on one’s religious beliefs. A medical exemption exempts a child
who is susceptible to adverse effects from the vaccine.41 Exemptions
based on philosophical beliefs refer to the statutory language that
does not restrict the exemption to purely religious or spiritual
beliefs,42 but allows objections based on personal, moral, or other
beliefs.43
Most public health exemptions have been in the area of
immunization. State immunization laws have a history dating back to
the middle of the nineteenth century.44 Local municipalities, counties,
cities, and boards of education were among the first to attempt to
enact school vaccination laws and policies. Boston became the first
U.S. city to require all public school children to show proof of
vaccination in 1827.45 Next came the states. Within thirty years,
Massachusetts would become the first state to enact a vaccination
requirement for school children in order to prevent the transmission of
smallpox.46 New York soon followed in 1862. Other states that passed
similar laws included Connecticut in 1872, Indiana in in 1881,

39.

Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and
Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization Laws: Individual and
Societal Risk of Measles, 282 JAMA 47 (1999).

40.

James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination
Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L. J.
831, 873 (2002).

41.

PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
ed., 2002).

AND

ETHICS: A READER, 379 (Lawrence O. Gostin

42.

Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40.

43.

See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 31.

44.

Jean M. Santoli & Alan Hinman, Nonmedical Exemptions to State
Immunization Laws, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 8 (2002).

45.

Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40, at 851.

46.

Kevin M. Malone & Alan Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public
Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PRACTICE 262, 269 (Richard A. Goodman et al., eds., 2d ed. 2007).
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Arkansas, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Virginia in 1882, California in 1888,
Iowa in 1889, and Pennsylvania in 1895.47
Although vaccinations were being used increasingly in schools,
opposition to vaccination laws also arose in many quarters.48 Indeed,
“[s]ome opponents expressed valid scientific objections about
effectiveness; some worried that vaccination transmitted other
diseases . . . or caused harmful effects; and others objected on grounds
of religious or philosophical principles.”49 In the seminal public health
case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts,50 Reverend Henning Jacobson
refused the vaccination, citing concerns over the vaccination’s safety
and claiming that he and his son had previously experienced adverse
reactions to vaccinations.51 In rejecting Jacobson’s contention and
upholding the Massachusetts statute, the Supreme Court noted that:
The authority of the state to enact this statute is to be referred
to what is commonly called the police power,—a power which
the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the
Union under the Constitution. Although this court has refrained
from any attempt to define the limits of that power, yet it has
distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact
quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description;’ indeed,
all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory
and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people
47.

Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40, at 851.

48.

See, e.g., The Coll. of Physicians of Phila., History of the Anti
OF
VACCINES,
Vaccination
Movements,
HIST.
http://historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/history-anti-vaccinationmovements (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (referring to the British
Vaccination Acts of 1853 and 1867 and noting that “[t]he Vaccination
Act of 1853 ordered mandatory vaccination for infants up to 3 months
old, and the Act of 1867 extended this age requirement to 14 years,
adding penalties for vaccine refusal. The laws were met with immediate
resistance from citizens who demanded the right to control their bodies
and those of their children.”); Allison M. Kennedy et al., Vaccine Beliefs
of Parents Who Oppose Compulsory Vaccination, 120 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 252, 257 (2005) (noting that “[o]pposition to compulsory
vaccination is not a new phenomenon; it has been present in some form
since the earliest compulsory vaccination laws.”); Zucht v. King, 260
U.S. 174, 175 (1922) (deciding the case of Rosalyn Zucht, a child
excluded from the San Antonio Texas public school because she did not
have the required certificate of vaccination and refused to submit to
vaccination).

49.

Hodge & Gostin, supra note 40, at 844.

50.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).

51.

Ben Horowitz, A Shot in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to
Jacobson v. Massachusetts Means for Mandatory Vaccinations During a
Public Health Emergency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1716, 1719 (2011).
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of other states. According to settled principles, the police power
of a state must be held to embrace; at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will
protect the public health and the public safety.52

Thus the court dismissed Jacobson’s exemption argument on the
basis that a “health regulation requiring small pox vaccination was a
reasonable exercise of the state’s police power that did not violate the
liberty rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.”53 Although in Jacobson, “the question was
whether the state had overstepped its own authority and whether the
sphere of personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment included the right to refuse vaccination,”54
others have noted that Jacobson’s brief was “riddled with religious
rhetoric.”55
Hundreds of cases have followed Jacobson’s reasoning.56 For
example, in Wright v. Dewitt School District No.1 of Arkansas
County, 57 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a state health
regulation which required all students to be vaccinated against
smallpox as prerequisite to attending school was a reasonable
regulation and a reasonable exercise of police power and as such did
not violate the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.58 In
that case, the appellants—adults and school age children—were
members of a church known as the General Assembly and Church of
the First Born.59 The appellee, DeWitt School District #1 of Arkansas
County, required all students to be vaccinated against smallpox as a
prerequisite to attending school pursuant to a state health regulation.
The appellants argued that this requirement violated their religious
beliefs. They also contended that the school age appellants had been
attending the schools operated by the Dewitt School District #1 for
52.

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24-25.

53.

Malone & Hinman, supra note 46, at 271.

54.

Wendy K. Mariner, et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your
Great-Great Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
581, 582 (2005).

55.

See Horowitz, supra note 51, at 1719 n.29 (citing Mariner, supra note
54, at 582 and noting that “while the brief filed by Jacobson was riddled
with religious rhetoric, the Court only addressed the health concern
advanced by Jacobson.”).

56.

Using Westlaw’s KeyCite citing references, 3,038 citations for the case
were shown as of August 2014.

57.

Wright v. De Witt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark.1965).

58.

Id.

59.

Id. at 645.
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many years without being vaccinated, and as a result no one had
suffered any adverse effect; that there had been no smallpox in
Arkansas County for more than fifty years; and that no immediate,
grave, or present danger existed which justified any infringement
upon their constitutional right to freely exercise their religious views.60
In dismissing their appeal, the Court noted that the appellants did
not have the legal right to resist on religious grounds the enforcement
of the health regulation requiring the vaccination of all children as a
prerequisite to attendance of the schools operated by the School
District.61
Here, the Court relied on the language from Jacobson v.
Massachusetts62 for the principle that “the police power of a state
must be held to embrace; at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public
health and the public safety.”63
1.

Recent Religious Exemption Challenges

Courts have consistently upheld immunization laws that mandate
vaccinations even when challenged on religious belief grounds.64 For
example, in Brown v. Stone,65 the Mississippi Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional a part of a statute that provided an
exemption to vaccination on religious grounds. The statute provided,
in relevant part that “[a] certificate of religious exemption may be
offered on behalf of a child by an officer of a church of a recognized
denomination. This certificate shall certify that parents or guardians
of the child are bona fide members of a recognized denomination
whose religious teachings require reliance on prayer or spiritual means

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).

63.

Wright, 385 S.W.2d at 647.

64.

See Daniel Salmon & Andrew Siegel, Religious and Philosophical
Exemptions from Vaccination Requirements and Lessons Learned from
Conscientious Objectors from Conscription, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 289
(2001) (noting that “[t]he jurisprudence the U.S. Supreme Court has
developed in cases in which religious beliefs conflict with public or state
interests suggests that mandatory immunization against dangerous
diseases does not violate the First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion . . . .”); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 221 (Miss. 1979) (noting
that “[t]he courts have weighed the interest of the state in protecting its
citizenry as against the desirability of religious freedom devoid of
unnecessary governmental intrusion and have generally concluded that
the state interest was paramount.”).

65.

Brown, 378 So.2d at 223.
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of healing.”66 In Brown, a father filed a suit seeking an injunction to
compel a school district to admit his son as a student even though his
son had not complied with the statute requiring immunization of all
students.67 The father argued that he did not permit his son to be
vaccinated because of strong and sincere religious beliefs, and that he
sought a religious exemption from vaccination for his son but was
denied because the certificate did not comply with the statute.68
Consequently, he contended that the religious exemption provisions of
the statute were invalid insofar as they forced complainants to join a
religious organization in order to practice their religious beliefs
freely.69
The Mississippi Court agreed with the father. In striking down
the exemption, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that
[t]he exception, which would provide for the exemption of
children of parents whose religious beliefs conflict with the
immunization requirements, would discriminate against the
great majority of children whose parents have no such religious
convictions. To give it effect would result in a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
which provides that no state shall make any law denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, in
that it would require the great body of school children to be
vaccinated and at the same time expose them to the hazard of
associating in school with children exempted under the religious
exemption who had not been immunized as required by the
statute.70

Critics might contend that Brown v. Stone is an example of a case
that overrides individual autonomy in favor of the police powers of
the state. For example, the Brown Court relies on Prince v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,71 Jacobson v. Massachusetts,72 and
Zucht v. King,73 for the principle that the U.S. Supreme Court has
long held that it is within the police power of the state to provide for
compulsory vaccination. This is only partially true. The U.S. Supreme
66.

Id. at 219.

67.

Id.

68.

Id. at 221.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. at 223.

71.

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

72.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).

73.

260 U.S. at 176.

269

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
The Public Health Implications of Religious Exemptions: A Balance
Between Public Safety and Personal Choice, or Religion Gone Too Far?

Court cases did not specifically hold that exemption from
immunizations violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, in Jacobson, Justice Harlan noted that the
courts may strike down legislation designed to protect the general
welfare when it has no real or substantial relation to the public
health, morals, or safety, or if the legislation is “a plain, palpable
invasion of rights” secured by the constitution.74 In his view, “the
police power of a state, whether exercised directly by the legislature,
or by local body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such
circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in
particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent
wrong and oppression.”75
However, there is a long line of cases, dating from 1830 to 2001
where courts have held that vaccination laws do not discriminate
against school children to the exclusion of others in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.76 In that sense, the Brown court was right in
striking the religious exemption.
A different line of religious exemption cases inquires whether the
challenger’s beliefs are religious and whether they are sincere. One
such case is Mason v. General Brown Central School District.77 In
that case, parents who advocated “a natural existence”78 challenged a
district court’s ruling dismissing their complaint which sought to
compel the school district to permit their son, based on his own
religious beliefs, and his parents’ beliefs, to attend public school
without being immunized as required by New York law.79 The law
required that all children be immunized before starting school but
provided an exemption to those who opposed immunization on
religious grounds.80 The plaintiffs belonged to a church group that had
no membership requirements, no worship or other services, and no
traditional doctrine.81 The district court found that as regards the

74.

197 U.S. at 31.

75.

Id. at 38.

76.

See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER, supra note 41, at 387.

77.

Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1988).

78.

Id. at 49 (finding that “the [Plaintiffs] believe that the human body
possesses the means of healing itself without medical intervention and
that therefore, immunizations are unnecessary and indeed contrary to
the ‘genetic blueprint’ intended by nature.”).

79.

Id. at 48.

80.

Id. at 49.

81.

Id.
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plaintiffs’ beliefs, “they were not essentially religious but were a mere
embodiment of chiropractic ethics.”82
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit analyzed whether the appellants’ beliefs were
religious. It agreed with the district court that the appellants’ beliefs
were not religious. The appellate court then analyzed whether the
organization to which the appellants belonged, possessed an indicia of
a religious group or order.83 In a telling analysis of the group, the
court stated:
The [group] has no rites of membership, no requirement of
active participation, no regular religious meetings, no system of
providing guidance to its members, no regular contact between
members and leaders, and no indication that it provides any
religious services, i.e., marriages, burials, or community and
humanitarian aid . . . . Significantly, anyone with the money
can ‘buy’ into the church and obtain any desired ecclesiastical
title (including bishop, priest, archbishop, friar, reverend, or
rabbi) by doing no more than filling out an application and then
writing out a check.84

Thus the religious exemption claim in Mason failed because the
courts deemed their beliefs primarily scientific in nature, non-religious
based, and that the group with which they were affiliated was not a
bona fide religious order.
A contrary outcome occurred in Turner v. Liverpool Central
School.85 In Turner, the plaintiff contended that the school district
violated her constitutional rights and those of her minor daughter by
failing to provide a religious exemption from the state’s immunization
requirement.86 Before registering her daughter for kindergarten, the
plaintiff notified the school district that she was religiously opposed to
the introduction of any foreign material into the human body and,
therefore, sought a religious exemption from New York State’s
immunization requirement. The plaintiff believed in universal life
force.87 After questioning the plaintiff, the district determined that the

82.

Id. at 50.

83.

Id. at 53.

84.

Id.

85.

186 F. Supp. 2d at 187.

86.

Id. at 187.

87.

The court noted that “Plaintiff believes in a Universal Life Force, which
is the manifestation of God in all things . . . . According to Plaintiff,
immunization interferes with the transmission of the life force and
disrupts one’s natural balance and, therefore, one’s ability to receive the
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congregation was not a genuine religion and that although the
plaintiff’s beliefs regarding immunization were sincere, they were
founded upon a personal philosophy rather than a legitimate
religion.88 In denying the district’s motion for dismissal, the court
found that the religious views that the plaintiff espoused appeared to
be religious in nature as opposed to merely philosophical or
scientific.89 In that case, the court found for the plaintiff noting that
the secular purpose of the exemption is to allow children whose
parents have a “genuine and sincere religious belief” that prohibits
them from having their children inoculated, to attend school.90
Why the disparate result between the plaintiff in Mason v.
General Brown Central School District advocating a natural existence
and the plaintiff in Turner v. Liverpool Central School District
belonging to universal life force that saw immunization as interfering
with the transmission of the life force and therefore disrupting one’s
natural balance? Is there sincerity in the latter and none in the
former? Perhaps the distinction rests on the fraudulent nature of the
church group in Mason. There, the court noted that “[w]hile it has
sometimes been difficult for us to establish precise standards by which
the bona fides of a religion may be judged, these difficulties have not
hindered us in denying protected status to organizations which are
‘obviously shams and absurdities’ and whose leaders ‘are patently
devoid of religious sincerity . . . .’ The [Universal Life Church] and
more specifically for purposes of this case, the [Davenport Universal
Life Church] is such an organization.”91
The problem with the sincerity analysis is three-fold. First, it is a
probing
interference
in
religion,
historically
considered
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.92 Second, at the
administrative level, it allows the school district to determine what
religious belief is and what it is not. This can be a slippery slope.
Third, because sincerity of beliefs is a fact specific endeavor, courts
risks being bogged down by collateral issues by putting the plaintiff
through a trial of his asserted beliefs, including, arguably, unorthodox
ones. However, the flip side of the argument against the sincerity
analysis is that “[w]hile courts must avoid determining the validity of
religious beliefs, at times it may be necessary to determine whether
life force . . . . In addition, Plaintiff believes that immunization violates
the sanctity of the body.” Id. at 189 n.2.
88.

Id. at 189.

89.

Id. at 189-90.

90.

Id. at 192.

91.

Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1988)

92.

BROUGHER, supra note 27, at 3.
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beliefs would qualify as religious for certain purposes, including
religious exemptions for statutory requirements.”93
2.

Implications for Public Health Practice

Although “[i]n practice, legal exemptions for vaccination
constitute only a small percentage of total school entrants[,] . . .
disease outbreaks in religious communities that have not been
vaccinated do occur” as shown by epidemiological evidence.94 Among
the most cited epidemiological studies include a study that reported
outbreaks of measles that occurred in two groups of Christian
Scientists in 1985. Thomas Novotny noted that “[t]hese outbreaks
resulted in 187 cases . . . [accounting] for 6.7 percent of 2,813 total
cases reported to CDC in 1985.”95 The authors attributed the
outbreak to state immunization laws that exempt religious groups.96
Another study quantified the risk of contracting measles among
individuals who claimed religious or philosophical exemptions from
immunization (exemptors) and compared the result with vaccinated
persons. The study also examined the risk that exemptors pose to the
nonexempt population. The study found that “[o]n average,
exemptors were [thirty-five] times more likely to contract measles
than were vaccinated persons.”97 Additionally, an increase or decrease
in the number of exemptors would affect the incidence of measles in
non-exempt populations. As Daniel Salmon found, “[i]f the number of
exemptors doubled, the incidence of measles infection in nonexempt
individuals would increase by 5.5 percent, 18.6 percent, and 30.8
percent, respectively, for intergroup mixing ratios of 20 percent, 40
percent, and 60 percent.”98 Similar findings were obtained by Daniel
Feikin and colleagues who “conducted a population-based
93.

Id.

94.

According to CDC’s report on vaccination coverage among children in
kindergarten for the 2012-2013 school year, “an estimated 91,453
exemptions were reported among a total estimated population of
4,242,558 kindergarteners. Overall, among the 49 states and DC that
reported 2012–13 school vaccination exemptions, the percentage of
kindergarteners with an exemption ranged from 0.1% in Mississippi to
6.5% in Oregon, with a median of 1.8%.” Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten –
United States, 2012–13 School Year, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 607, 607-609 (2013); PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A
READER, supra note 41.

95.

Thomas Novotny et al., Measles Outbreaks in Religious Groups Exempt
from Immunization Laws, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 49, 50 (1988).

96.

Id. at 52.

97.

Salmon et al., supra note 39.

98.

Id.
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retrospective cohort study using data collected on standardized forms
regarding all reported measles and pertussis cases among children
aged three to eighteen years in Colorado during 1987-1998.”99 They
found that those who had religious or personal exemptions from
vaccinations were on average twenty-two times more likely to acquire
measles and six times more likely to acquire pertussis than vaccinated
children.100 They further found that “[i]n children of day care and
primary school age, in whom contact rates and susceptibility are
higher, these risks were approximately 62-fold and 16-fold greater
among exemptors for measles and pertussis, respectively.”101 In 2000,
the CDC reported that “the two most recent outbreaks of polio
reported in the United States affected members of religious groups
who object to vaccination (i.e., outbreaks occurred in 1972 among
Christian Scientists and in 1979 among members of an Amish
community).”102 Between September 2004 and February 2005, the
CDC further reported that there were 345 cases of pertussis affecting
primarily preschool aged children among the Amish in Kent County,
Delaware. The report noted that vaccine-preventable disease
outbreaks continue to occur among under-vaccinated populations in
the United States, including contained religious communities.103
Jessica Atwell has noted that “[a]s recent as 2010, 9,120 cases of
pertussis were reported in California, more than any year since
1947.”104 Atwell similarly concluded that geographic areas with nonmedical exemptions are associated with high rate of pertussis.105
Finally, in September 2013, the Texas Tribune reported that “[i]n
Tarrant County, an unvaccinated man contracted measles abroad and
spread the disease to twenty people at Eagle Mountain International

99.

Daniel Feikin, et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and
Pertussis Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284
JAMA 3145, 3145 (2000).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1349.
102. D. Rebecca Prevots et al., Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States:
Updated Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP), 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1, 9
(2000).
103. P. Eggers et al., Pertusis Outbreak in Amish Community – Kent County
Delaware, September 2004 - February 2005, 55 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 817, 817 (2006).
104. Jessica Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in
California, 2010, 132 PEDIATRICS 624, 624 (2013).
105. Id. at 629.
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Church who had not been vaccinated or had not received a second
dose of the MMR vaccine, as recommended.”106
These studies and reports tend to show that there is a link
between religious exemption laws in vaccination and public health.
The effects clearly place public health at risk. Consequently, personal
and religious belief exemptions should be eliminated because they
present a risk to the “herd immunity.”107 For example, in a globalized
world, with frequent travel, transmission of vaccine-preventable
diseases is much easier and more widespread; therefore, those who
choose not to be vaccinated based on religious beliefs endanger the
health of not only the members of their immediate communities, but
many other people in places that are easily reachable by travel.108
Measured against this standard, a strong argument can be made for
doing away with religious exemptions in vaccination and in public
health altogether. In spite of the evidence, surprisingly, states have
expanded religious exemptions in other public health areas, notably in
contraception and in quarantine and isolation.
B.

Contraception

Contraception plays a significant role in women’s health and
public health in general. It is vital to preventing unintended
106. Becca Aaronson, Outbreaks Make a Case for Vaccination, TEX.
TRIBUNE,
Sept.
9,
2013,
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/09/09/outbreaks-make-casevaccinations/.
107. Herd immunity generally means that above a certain immunization
percentage rate in a population, a disease cannot spread to enough
people during its incubation period to sustain itself. Thus, the higher the
immunization rate, the more immune the population would be to the
disease. Professor Epstein points out that “[i]mportantly, the efficacy of
a vaccine from a societal standpoint depends largely on how widespread
the use of the vaccine is. A free-rider problem arises whenever someone
decides not to take the vaccine, thinking that the targeted disease is
near eradication because everyone else has taken the vaccine. Note that
the public benefit of any vaccination program decreases as more people
make this strategic choice.” Richard Epstein & Catherine Sharkey,
Products Liability, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 794 (10th ed., 2012).
108. For example, in 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) reported that measles had infected 129 people in thirteen states,
the most in the first four months of any year since 1996. Thirty-four of
the cases were imported via travel to other countries, including
seventeen from the Philippines where a huge outbreak had affected
20,000 people and caused sixty-nine deaths. Lenny Bernstein, CDC
Reports Biggest Measles Outbreak Since 1996, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2014/04/24/cdc-reports-13-measles-outbreaks-in-the-u-smost-cases-since-1996/.
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pregnancies, which account for half of all pregnancies among
American women.109 According to a 2011 Institute of Medicine study,
approximately 49 percent of pregnancies in the United States were
unintended.110 Contraception reduces unintended pregnancies,
abortions, and may prevent the spread of sexually transmitted
infections, such as HIV/AIDS.111 The CDC lists family planning as
one of the ten great public health achievements of the twentieth
century.112 Additionally, the CDC notes that “the most important
determinant of declining fertility in developing countries is
contraceptive use, which explains 92 percent of the variation in
fertility among fifty countries.”113
While “various methods of contraception have been utilized since
Roman times, contraceptive birth control information and
contraceptive devices were once prohibited” by state and federal law
in the United States.114 Contraceptives were considered obscene and
immoral.115 The modern birth control movement began in 1912.116 In
1916, Margaret Sanger, a public health nurse concerned about the
adverse health effects of frequent childbirth, challenged the laws that
suppressed the distribution of birth control information by opening
the first family planning clinic in Brooklyn, New York.117 Sanger
challenged the “Comstock Act . . . which prohibited the importation
and transmittal through the mails of any contraceptive devices or any

109. Barriers to Contraceptive Access for Low-Income Women, NAT’L INST.
REPROD.
HEALTH
FOR
http://www.nirhealth.org/sections/publications/documents/contraceptiv
eaccessquicksheetFINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
110. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES
THE GAPS 79, 102 (2011).

FOR

WOMEN: CLOSING

111. NAT’L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, supra note 109.
112. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health,
1900–1999: Family Planning, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 1073, 1073 (1999).
113. Id. at 1076.
114. PETER N. SWISHER ET
§ 5:11 (9th ed. 2014).

AL.,

FAMILY LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE

AND

FORMS

115. See Note, Judicial Regulation of Birth Control Under Obscenity Laws,
50 YALE L. J. 682, 682 (1941) (noting that “[r]egulation of
contraceptives began in 1873 . . . . By forbidding the mailing,
importation, and interstate transportation of indecent articles, obscene
publications and ‘contraceptives,’ Congress hoped to check the moral
degeneration that followed the Civil War.”).
116. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 112, at 1073.
117. Id.
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writings describing contraceptive devices.”118 Although Sanger was
threatened with a forty-five year jail term for violating the Act, and
was later jailed for a month,119 she continued to challenge the law.
These challenges established a legal precedent that allowed physicians
to provide advice on contraception for health reasons.120 During the
1920s and 1930s, Sanger continued to promote family planning by
opening more clinics.121 As a result, physicians gained the right to
counsel patients and to prescribe contraceptive methods. By the
1930s, a few state health departments and public hospitals had begun
to provide family planning services.122
In the 1960s, the contraceptive pill and the intrauterine device
(IUD) were put on the American market, despite heated objections
from various religious groups.123 Among those opposing the pill was
the Roman Catholic Church, which had officially banned any
“artificial” means of birth control in 1930.124
In 1961, Dr. C. Lee Buxton, the chairman of the Yale Medical
School department of obstetrics and gynecology, and Estelle Griswold,
the executive director of Connecticut Planned Parenthood, opened
four Planned Parenthood clinics. They were arrested for defying a
Connecticut law that made it a crime to use birth control.125 Their
prosecution led to the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Connecticut statute
forbidding use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy
that is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.126 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the

118. SWISHER ET AL., supra note 114, at § 5.11 n. 1.
119. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 30A FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 6359 (2014).

AND

120. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 112, at 1073.
121. Id. at 1073-74.
122. Id. at 1074.
123. SWISHER, supra note 114.
124. The American Experience, People & Events: The Catholic Church and
Birth
Control,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_church.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2014).
125. The American Experience, Timeline: The Pill 1951-1990, at 3, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/timeline/timeline2.html
(last
visited Jan. 28, 2014).
126. 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486 (1965).
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distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults was also
unconstitutional.127
America has since evolved from its early history of prohibiting
contraception to present-day practices where a substantial number of
states are affirmatively providing state-supported family planning
information and services for the benefit of their citizens. In 1978,
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) which
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The PDA
prohibited employment discrimination against a person because of
pregnancy or because of child/pregnancy-related medical issues.128 In
December 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) ruled that exclusion of prescription contraceptives from a
health insurance plan violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.129
Since 1998, several state legislatures have passed contraceptive
equity laws which require that “[g]enerally, if an insurer or plan
covers other prescription drugs and/or outpatient services, it must
also cover contraceptives and contraceptive services—and it must do
so on comparable terms.”130 According to the Guttmacher Institute,
“[twenty-eight] states [now] require insurers that cover prescription
drugs to [also] provide coverage of the full range of FDA approved
contraceptive drugs and devices.”131 Many of those states “do not
allow religious hospitals to opt out. And nearly half do not allow
religious universities to refuse, either.”132 Among the states that do
not have religious refusal clauses include Colorado133, Georgia134,

127. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
129. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N , Decision on Coverage of
Contraception
(Dec.
14,
2000)
,
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html.
130. Contraceptive Equity Laws in the States CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS,
http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/contraceptive-equity-laws-inthe-states (last updated Jan. 4, 2006).
131. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
CONTRACEPTIVES
(Feb.
1,
2015),
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf.
132. Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Birth Control: A Matter of Public Health,
Women’s
Choice,
NJ.COM,
Feb.
07,
2012,
http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2012/02/birth_control_a_matt
er_of_publ.html.
133. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-104 (West 2014) on maternity coverage
stating that “[a]ll group sickness and accident insurance policies
providing coverage within the state . . . shall insure against the expense
of normal pregnancy and childbirth or provide coverage for maternity
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Iowa135, New Hampshire136, Vermont137, and Wisconsin.138 California,
New York, and Oregon provide limited religious exclusions. For
example, the California Insurance Code on disability, insurance, and
contraceptive coverage provides that “a religious employer may
request a disability insurance policy without coverage for
contraceptive methods that are contrary to the religious employer’s

care and provide coverage for contraception in the same manner as any
other sickness, injury, disease . . . .”
134. See GA. CODE § 33-24-59.6 (2014) on coverage for prescription drugs
and devices for contraception stating in pertinent part that “[e]very
health benefit policy that is delivered, issued, executed, or renewed in
this state or approved for issuance or renewal in this state by the
Commissioner on or after July 1, 1999, which provides coverage for
prescription drugs on an outpatient basis shall provide coverage for any
prescribed drug or device approved by the United States Food and Drug
Administration for use as a contraceptive.”
135. See IOWA CODE § 514C.19 (2014) (prohibiting various health insurance
plans that provide benefits for outpatient prescription drugs, devices or
services from denying or restricting benefits for FDA-approved
prescription contraceptive drugs, devices or outpatient services).
136. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-I (2014) (requiring, among other
things that “[e]ach insurer that issues or renews any group policy of
accident or health insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital
expenses, which provides coverage for outpatient services shall provide
to each group, or to the portion of each group comprised of certificate
holders of such insurance who are residents of this state, coverage for
outpatient contraceptive services under the same terms and conditions
as for other outpatient services.”).
137. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4099c (2014) (stating that “[a] health
insurance plan shall provide coverage for outpatient contraceptive
services including sterilizations, and shall provide coverage for the
purchase of all prescription contraceptives and prescription
contraceptive devices approved by the federal Food and Drug
Administration.” Additionally, “[a] health insurance plan . . . shall not
establish any rate, term or condition that places a greater financial
burden on an insured or beneficiary for access to contraceptive services,
prescription contraceptives and prescription contraceptive devices than
for access to treatment, prescriptions or devices for any other health
condition.”).
138. WIS. STAT. § 609.805 and § 632.895(17) (2014) (requiring that, on
coverage of contraceptives, insurance policies and self-insured health
plans that provide coverage for outpatient health care services,
preventive services or prescription drugs and devices also provide
coverage for contraceptives prescribed by a health care provider). The
law also requires that any outpatient services that are necessary to
prescribe, administer, maintain or remove a contraceptive be provided if
such services are covered for any other drug benefits. See also NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 32.
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religious tenets.”139 Similarly, the Health and Safety Code on religious
employer exemption provides, in pertinent part, that “a religious
employer may request a health care service plan contract without
coverage for federal Food and Drug Administration approved
contraceptive methods that are contrary to the religious employer’s
religious tenets. If so requested, a health care service plan contract
shall be provided without coverage for contraceptive methods.”140
Despite several states having religious exclusions for their
contraceptive equity laws, great strides have been made in provision
of contraceptives since the early 1900s. This has indeed been good for
public health. The Georgia statute, for example, notes that
maternal and infant health are greatly improved when women
have access to contraceptive supplies to prevent unintended
pregnancies, that the absence of prescription contraceptive
coverage is largely responsible for the fact that women spend 68
percent more in out-of-pocket expenses for health care than
men; and requiring insurance coverage for prescription drugs
and devices for contraception is in the public interest in
improving the health of mothers, children, and families and in
providing for health insurance coverage which is fairer and more
equitable.141

Nevertheless, in spite of these great strides in availability and
access to contraceptives, the debate between access to and use of
contraceptives vis-à-vis one’s religious convictions still rages on, both
in state courts and increasingly in federal courts.142 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.,143 shed some light on
this issue, though it still left some questions unanswered.144 In order to
help the reader understand the legal battles leading to the Hobby
Lobby decision, this article now provides a brief account of the state
and federal cases where plaintiffs challenged contraception laws.
139. CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2014).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2014).
141. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (West 2014).
142. This increase is attributable to the passage of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124 Stat.
119, 131 (2010), which required certain preventive health services and
screenings to be covered in all new health insurance, plans without cost
sharing.
143. 134 S.Ct. at 2751.
144. For example, because Hobby Lobby challenged forms of contraception
that prevent uterine implantation, but did not object to those that
prevent conception, it is unclear what will happen to cases where
plaintiffs are challenging all the contraceptives.
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II. CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LAWS AND RELIGIOUS
REFUSAL CLAUSES145
A.

State Precedents

In Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento, Catholic
Charities, a social service organization, challenged the provisions of
the Women’s Contraception Equity Act (WCEA)146 requiring those
employers that provided group health care and disability insurance
prescription coverage for their employees to include coverage for
prescription contraceptives.147 The WCEA provides an exemption that
“permits a religious employer to request a policy that includes drug
coverage but excludes coverage for contraceptive methods that are
contrary to the religious employer’s religious tenets.”148 The law
describes a “religious employer” as “an entity for which each of the
following is true:”
(A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the
entity.
(B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the
religious tenets of the entity.
(C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious
tenets of the entity.
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described
in Section 6033(a)(2)(A) i or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended.149

The charity “challenged the exemption as involving an
impermissible distinction between religious and secular activities of a
religious institution.”150 Additionally, it argued that the law violates
the Free Exercise Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions by
coercing the organization to violate its religious beliefs, in that the
law, by regulating the content of insurance policies, in effect requires
145. As of the time of writing this article, there are several court cases that
have made their way through state supreme courts and in the federal
circuits challenging laws that require religious organization charities to
cover birth control for their employees.
146. 32 Cal.4th 527, 85 P.3d 67 (Ca. 2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1367.25(a) (West 2000).
147. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 73.
148. Id. at 74.
149. § 1367.25(b)(1).
150. Bailey, supra note 21, at 376.
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employers who offer their workers’ insurance for prescription drugs to
offer coverage for prescription contraceptives.151 In upholding the
exemption against this challenge, the California Supreme Court first
noted that Catholic Charities did not qualify as a “religious employer”
under the Women’s Contraception Equity Act because it did not meet
any of the definition’s four criteria.152 The court further noted that
Catholic Charities did not primarily employ persons who share its
Roman Catholic religious beliefs, but rather employed a diverse group
of persons of many religious backgrounds, all of whom shared its
Gospel-based commitment to promote a just, compassionate society
that supports the dignity of individuals and families.153 Additionally,
the court found that “Catholic Charities [served] people of all faith
backgrounds, a significant majority of [whom] did not share [its]
Roman Catholic faith . . . . Consequently, . . . [it was] not entitled to
an exemption from the mandate imposed by the [law].”154
Second, regarding the violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the
court, citing Employment Division. v. Smith, stated that the U.S.
Supreme Court “articulated the general rule that religious beliefs do
not excuse compliance with otherwise valid laws regulating matters
the state is free to regulate . . . . [T]he right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).’”155
One commentator has argued that the California Supreme Court
interpreted the “religious employer” distinction wrongly, stating:
The question is once the legislature has decided to grant an
exemption to a religious employer, may it further define
‘religious employer’ in such a radical way that some employers
that one would ordinarily think of as religious (Catholic
Charities) do not qualify because the legislature has deemed
them ‘secular’ . . . ? Catholic Charities argued that the parsing
of the religious organization into secular components was
problematic but the court failed to address the argument
altogether.156

151. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 81.
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id. at 75.
155. Id. at 81.
156. Bailey, supra note 21, at 377.
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The California Supreme Court correctly upheld the Act’s narrow
religious exemption. First the court rightly noted that the law’s
requirements apply neutrally and generally to all employers,
regardless of religious affiliation, except to those few who satisfy the
statute’s strict requirements for exemption on religious grounds.157
Catholic Charities did not. Second, in terms of public health, the
court makes the following compelling argument:
The Legislature enacted the WCEA in 1999 to eliminate gender
discrimination in health care benefits and to improve access to
prescription contraceptives. Evidence before the Legislature
showed that women during their reproductive years spent as
much as 68 percent more than men in out-of-pocket health care
costs, due in large part to the cost of prescription contraceptives
and the various costs of unintended pregnancies, including
health risks, premature deliveries and increased neonatal care.
Evidence also showed that, while most health maintenance
organizations (HMO’s) covered prescription contraceptives, not
all preferred provider organization (PPO) and indemnity plans
did. As a result, approximately 10 percent of commercially
insured Californians did not have coverage for prescription
contraceptives.158

The above statement offers a justification as to why the California
legislature passed the law as a way of eliminating gender
discrimination. In essence, “a failure to provide contraceptive coverage
when a plan does include prescriptive drug benefits amounts to sex
discrimination.”159
A similar constitutional challenge was mounted in New York, in
Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio.160 In that case, Catholic
Charities challenged the validity of legislation requiring health
insurance policies that provide coverage for prescription drugs to
include coverage for contraception.161 The court found that the
“Women’s Health and Wellness Act (WHWA) [mandated] expanded
health insurance coverage for a variety of services needed by women,
including mammography, cervical cytology, and bone density
screening.”162 The WHWA contained provisions requiring that an
employer health insurance contract “which provides coverage for
157. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 82.
158. Id. at 74.
159. Bailey, supra note 21, at 380.
160. 859 N.E.2d 459 (2006).
161. Id. at 461.
162. Id.
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prescription drugs shall include coverage for the cost of contraceptive
drugs or devices.”163 Catholic Charities argued that the provisions
“[violated] their rights under the religion clauses of the federal and
state constitutions.”164 They objected to the contraceptive coverage
mandated in the WHWA.165
Just like in Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento,
discussed above, the New York court found as a threshold matter that
none of the plaintiffs qualified as a “religious employer” under the
WHWA,166 because the “plaintiffs are not, or are not only, churches
ministering to the faithful, but are providers of social and educational
services.”167 Additionally, most of the plaintiffs acknowledged that
they employ many people not of their faith, and that they serve
people not only of their faith.168
Turning to the Free Exercise Clause argument, the New York
court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that WHWA burdened their
First Amendment rights and instead held that the Act is a generally
applicable and neutral statute. The court found that “[t]he fact that
some religious organizations—in general, churches and religious orders
that limit their activities to inculcating religious values in people of
their own faith—are exempt from the WHWA’s provisions on
contraception does not, as plaintiffs claim, demonstrate that these
provisions are not ‘neutral.’”169 More important to this discussion is
the New York court’s reliance on public health grounds to explain the
passage of the law. The court observed:
The Legislature debated the scope of the ‘religious employer’
exemption intensely before the WHWA was passed. A broader
exemption was proposed, one that would have been available to
any ‘group or entity . . . supervised or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization or denominational
group or entity’ . . . . Supporters of this version of the
exemption argued, as do plaintiffs here, that religious
organizations should not be forced to violate the commands of
their faith. Those favoring a narrower exemption asserted that
the broader one would deprive tens of thousands of women

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 463.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 464.
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employed by church-affiliated organizations of contraceptive
coverage. Their view prevailed.170

Most significantly, both the California and the New York courts
emphasized the public health importance of the narrow religious
exemptions. Whereas the plaintiffs in both cases would have liked for
the courts to not have distinguished between “religious employers”
and “secular activities of religious organizations,”171 the courts read
the statutes narrowly, thereby ensuring that tens of thousands of
women employed by church-affiliated organizations would receive
contraceptive coverage. This is a victory for public health for two
principal reasons: First, both the legislatures and respective supreme
courts acknowledged the importance of contraceptives to public
health. Second, the rulings are a victory because many public health
practitioners see these religious exemptions as aiding or advancing
religion.172 For public health practitioners, a public health law that
does not provide for a religious exemption, such as the one in
Mississippi, or a narrower religious exemption, such as the ones in
New York and California, are preferable to the broader exemptions
advocated by the plaintiffs in these cases. Of course, public health
practitioners recognize that these are two competing trends. Putting
aside constitutional arguments, a no-religious exemption trend is
better than the other because elimination of the religious exemptions
will reduce the danger of putting individuals at risk for contracting
diseases.
In sum, whereas state courts have consistently upheld laws
mandating vaccination and contraception against religious exemption
and constitutional challenges, in the federal courts, the results have
been mixed.
B.

Federal Precedents

The distinction between federal and state precedents is that
federal court precedents have involved challenges from both religious
entities and for-profit corporations.173 These challenges have been
170. Id. at 462.
171. See Catholic Charities v. Superior Court of Sacramento, 85 P.3d 67, 79
(Ca. 2004).
172. Turner v. Liverpool Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191 (N.D.N.Y.
2002).
173. According to a report by the National Women’s Law Center, “90
lawsuits have been filed in federal courts challenging the Affordable
Care Act’s no cost-sharing provisions . . . [forty-five] of the cases have
been filed by for profit companies ranging from a crafts store chain to
an HVAC company.” NAT’L. WOMEN’S LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF THE
LAWSUITS CHALLENGING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S NO COST-
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premised on the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).174 The
challenges have been fueled largely by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA).
1.

The Affordable Care Act and the Contraception Mandate

Congress passed the ACA in 2010.175 The centerpiece of the ACA
was its focus on preventive services in health. During the legislative
process, an amendment to the ACA (known as the Women’s Health
Amendment) required coverage for recommended preventive services
for women without cost sharing.176 The “U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) charged the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
with reviewing what preventive services are important to women’s
health and well-being and then recommending which of these should
be considered in the development of comprehensive guidelines.”177 The
IOM made several recommendations regarding women’s reproductive
health including, but not limited to, “a [full] range of contraceptive
education, counseling, methods, and services so that women can
better avoid unwanted pregnancies and space their pregnancies to
promote optimal birth outcomes.”178 HHS adopted these
recommendations as part of the ACA guidelines. In response to the
request for comments on the interim final regulations, “most
commenters, including some religious organizations, recommended
that the [Department’s] guidelines include contraceptive services for
all women and that this requirement be binding on all group health
plans and health insurance issuers with no religious exemption.”179
SHARING CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE BENEFIT 1 (Nov. 2013), available
at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/contraceptive_coverage_litigati
on_overview_11-11-13_v2_vf.pdf.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
175. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 2713, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
176. David Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health
Amendment,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
3,
2009,
available
at
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passeswomens-health-amendment/?_r=0.
177. INST.

MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING
GAPS:
REPORT
BRIEF,
1
(2011)
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/ClinicalPreventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf/.
OF

THE

178. Id. at 2.
179. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
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Others asserted that “requiring group health plans sponsored by
religious employers to cover contraceptive services that their faith
deems contrary to its religious tenets would impinge upon their
religious freedom.”180 HHS amended its rules to provide for religious
exemption where contraceptive services are involved.181 For purposes
of the exemption, a religious employer is one that: “(1) has the
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs
persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons
who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization
under section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the
Code.”182 The religious employer exemption was modeled after the
method of religious accommodation used in several states that already
required health insurance issuers to provide coverage for
contraception.183
Plaintiffs have since brought several actions in federal courts
challenging the lawfulness of the preventive services coverage
regulations.184 Two cases, Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. et al. v. Sebelius185
and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS,186 are germane to this
article.187 In the former, appellants, two for-profit corporations—
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc.—and the corporations’
owners, challenged the district court’s denial of their motion for
preliminary injunction, contending that the requirement that Hobby
Lobby’s group health plan cover all forms of FDA-approved contraceptives violates RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
Administrative Procedure Act.188 Hobby Lobby et al., emphasized
Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. § 147).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (“Sections 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii) [of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 as amended], refer to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and
conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively
religious activities of any religious order.”).
183. Id.
184. For a list of cases then challenging the Contraceptive Mandate, see
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the United States HHS,
724 F.3d 377, 396 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting).
185. 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).
186. 724 F.3d 377.
187. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently upheld Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.
et al., v. Sebelius, and reversed Conestoga Wood Specialities v. HHS
(now Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Burwell). See Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
188. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125.
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that they objected to forms of contraception that prevent uterine
implantation, but did not object to those that prevent conception.189
The questions for consideration at the court of appeals were as
follows: “(1) whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel are ‘persons’
exercising religion for purposes of RFRA; (2) if so, whether the
corporations’ religious exercise is substantially burdened; and (3) if
there is a substantial burden, whether the government can
demonstrate a narrowly tailored compelling government interest.”190
The court answered the first two questions in the affirmative noting
that individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and keep their
free exercise rights, and unincorporated individuals may pursue profit
while keeping their free exercise rights.191 In addressing the
contraceptive mandate, the court found that the contraceptivecoverage requirement was invalid as applied to Hobby Lobby because
that requirement is not “the least restrictive means of advancing a
compelling interest.”192
2.

Implications for Public Health Practice

From a public health standpoint, there are several problems with
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Hobby Lobby. First,
the decision encroaches on the doctor-patient relationship. In other
words, certain decisions, such as which contraception to use or which
medicine or form of treatment an employee should pursue should be
left for the employee and his or her doctor.193 As Judge Rovner noted
in the dissent in Grote v. Sebelius:
Any given medical decision, depending on the nature of the
patient’s condition, the available treatments, and the
circumstances confronted by doctor and patient, might be
inconsistent with the religious beliefs of one or more owners of
the company that sponsors the patient’s workplace insurance.
Holding that a company shareholder’s religious beliefs and
practices are implicated by the autonomous health care
decisions of company employees, such that the obligation to
insure those decisions, when objected to by a shareholder,
represents a substantial burden on that shareholder’s religious
189. Id. at 1126. Essentially, Hobby Lobby objected to drugs and devices
with known post-fertilization mechanism of action, i.e., those drugs and
devices that could cause abortions.
190. Id. at 1126.
191. Id. at 1143.
192. Id. at 1143-44.
193. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting).
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liberties, strikes me as an unusually expansive understanding of
what acts in the commercial sphere meaningfully interfere with
an individual’s religious beliefs and practices.194

One can therefore argue that “[a]llowing religious doctrine to
prevail over the need for competent [medical] care and a woman’s
right to complete and accurate information about her condition and
treatment choices violates [not only] medical ethics [but also] existing
law.”195 To this point, one commentator has noted that “[f]or almost a
half-century, the Supreme Court has held that people have the
fundamental right to control their reproductive autonomy, which
includes the right to purchase and use contraceptives. The
government has a compelling interest in helping to facilitate the
ability of people, and especially women, to exercise this basic right of
reproductive autonomy.” 196
Second, allowing employers to refuse to cover certain services,
based on their (employers) personal religious beliefs will likely create
major structural and logistical problems in the U.S. healthcare
system, where the employer sponsored healthcare plans play a
significant role.197 “The system of employer-sponsored health insurance
has long provided coverage to the vast majority of America’s workers
and their dependents.”198 Indeed, “in the first half of 2003, the U.S.
employer-based health insurance market provided insurance to over
159 million Americans who constitute nearly two-thirds (63.4 percent)
of the population under 65.”199 Generally, the employer pays the
insurance premium subsidy to the health insurer, which in turn pays
for the medical costs of the employee. In this instance, the insurance
company decides what to pay and what not to pay for. Should
insurance companies decline, for example, to pay for certain
contraceptives based on the employers’ religious beliefs? And since
194. Id. at 866.
195. Editorial, When Bishops Direct Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/opinion/when-bishopsdirect-medical-care.html?_r=0.
196. Erwin Chemerinsky, God, Birth Control and Corporate America:
Claiming Religious Freedom to Avoid Providing Insurance for
Contraceptives Runs Afoul of the Law, NAT’L., L. J., Dec. 9, 2013, at 38.
197. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen et al., When Religious Freedom Clashes with
Access to Care, 371 NEJM 596, 596-98 (2014) (noting that “Hobby
Lobby’s outcome is of concern to U.S. health care professionals because
our health insurance system is still largely dependent on employers.”).
198. Mark Stanton, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., EmployerSponsored Health Insurance Trends in Cost and Access, 17 AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY: RES. IN ACTION 1, 2 (2004).
199. Id.
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insurance companies tend to have large pools of subscribers, how
would they distinguish payments for those using contraceptives and
those not using contraceptives? As some commentators have so aptly
noted, “[e]mployers and employees may have fundamentally different
perspectives on which medical interventions are acceptable,
particularly when the employer’s fundamental mission is not to
advance specific religious beliefs and its employees are therefore
unlikely to be drawn exclusively from its own religious group.”200
Third, the protection of women’s health is a compelling
governmental interest. For example, in 2001, an IOM report found
that 42 percent of unintended pregnancies in the United States ended
in abortion.201 The report also found that “[t]he risk factors for
unintended pregnancy are female gender and reproductive
capacity.”202 Additionally, “[w]omen suffer disproportionate rates of
chronic disease and disability from some conditions, and often have
high out-of-pocket health care costs.”203 And “[e]ven though slightly
over half of the U.S. population is female, apart from reproductive
concerns, medical research historically has neglected the health needs
of women.”204 The government has and often does address these needs
through legislation such as the contraceptive mandate.
Another compelling governmental interest is in reducing health
disparities. Significant racial and ethnic disparities exist in women’s
health. For example, non-Hispanic black and some Hispanic
populations have preterm births at rates 60 percent and 27 percent
higher, respectively, than the rate for non-Hispanic white women.205 In
terms of teen pregnancy, teenagers who give birth are much more
likely than older women to deliver a low birth weight or preterm
infant, and their babies are at higher risk for dying in infancy.
Additionally, the annual public costs associated with births among

200. Cohen et al., supra note 197, at 598.
201. See INST. OF MED, supra note 110, at 102.
202. Id. at 103.
203. Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, NAT’L ACAD.
PRESS http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13181/clinical-preventive-servicesfor-women-closing-the-gaps (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
204. INST. OF MED., WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH: PROGRESS, PITFALLS
PROMISE 1 (2010).

AND

205. Committee Opinion Number 317: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Women’s Health, 106 AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS
889,
890
(Oct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.acog.org//media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-forUnderserved-Women/co317.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20141026T1033161790.
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teenage girls are an estimated $10.9 billion.206 Making contraceptives
accessible to women thus serves the twin public health functions of
addressing health disparities among women and preventing unwanted
pregnancies. The editorial board of the New England Journal of
Medicine underscored this point, writing:
If the full panel of FDA-approved contraceptive services is made
available to American women, the public health of the country
will benefit. If a woman’s religious beliefs compel her to decline
such services, she has the right to do so. But to deny coverage
for these vital public health services to women who want them
but cannot afford them outside their employer-sponsored
insurance would be a personal and public health tragedy.207

The court in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. HHS208 arrived
at the opposite conclusion from the court in Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.
et al. v. Sebelius. In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., appellants
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, a secular, for-profit
corporation, and five of its shareholders, the Hahns, contended that
providing the mandated coverage would violate their religious beliefs
under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.209 In rejecting the
appellants contention, the court first noted, as a threshold matter,
that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot engage in religious
exercise.210 The court based its reasoning on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
reasoning in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that “certain
guarantees are held by corporations and that certain guarantees are
‘purely personal’ because ‘the historic function of the particular
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.’”211 The
Free Exercise Clause, noted the court of appeals, is one such
guarantee.212
The Conestoga decision squared with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, which also held that secular, profit-seeking
corporate employers are not a person capable of “religious exercise” as

206. Stephanie Ventura et al., Pregnancy and Childbirth Among Females
Aged 10–19 Years – United States, 2007–2010, 62 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 71, 71 (2013).
207. Editorial, Contraception at Risk, 370 NEJM 77, 78 (2013).
208. 724 F.3d 377 (3d. Cir. 2013).
209. Id. at 380.
210. Id. at 388.
211. Id. at 383 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
778 n. 14 (1978)).
212. Id. at 388.
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intended by RFRA.213 More recently, the same Sixth Circuit Court in
Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell,214 held that that nonprofit
entities affiliated with the Catholic Church that have religious
objections to certain preventive care standards under the ACA failed
to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its claim
that the ACA’s contraceptive-coverage requirement violated RFRA,
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Establishment Clause.215
On the other hand, several federal circuit courts, including the
District of Columbia and both the Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts
of Appeals, have held that for-profit corporations can be considered
“persons” exercising religion for purposes of RFRA, and that the forprofit corporations’ religious exercise is substantially burdened by the
contraceptive mandate.216 This circuit split was finally resolved by the
U.S. Supreme Court.

III. The U.S. Supreme Court Brings the Curtain Down,
“Let the Government Pay”: Implications for Public
Health Practice
In June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court settled the circuit split
above by affirming the judgment of the Tenth Circuit217 and reversing
the judgment of the Third Circuit.218 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
ruled in a consolidated opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores
Inc.,219 that the contraception mandate is unlawful, noting that as
applied to closely held corporations, the HHS’s regulations imposing
the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA because it is not the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.220
The Court first determined that Congress included corporations
within RFRA’s definition of “persons.”221 Second, it found that for-

213. Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 626.
214. Michigan Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Serv. v. Burwell, 755
F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014).
215. Id. at 398.
216. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2013); Grote v.
Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 866 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
217. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.
2013).
218. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dept. of Health
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
219. 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2769.
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profit corporations can exercise religion under RFRA.222 Third, the
Court noted that the mandate placed a substantial burden on the
corporation’s exercise of religion. The court assumed that the HHS
had shown a compelling interest for the mandate, but failed the
second prong of the test—that is, whether the contraceptive mandate
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 223
Notably, the Court seemed to endorse, and even encourage, the
idea that the government could simply accommodate for-profit
corporations’ religious beliefs by paying for the contraceptive. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy remarked:
The parties who were the plaintiffs in the District Courts argue
that the Government could pay for the methods that are found
objectionable . . . . In discussing this alternative, the Court does
not address whether the proper response to a legitimate claim
for freedom in the health care arena is for the Government to
create an additional program . . . . The Court properly does not
resolve whether one freedom should be protected by creating
incentives for additional government constraints. In these cases,
it is the Court’s understanding that an accommodation may be
made to the employers without imposition of a whole new
program or burden on the Government. As the Court makes
clear, this is not a case where it can be established that it is
difficult to accommodate the government’s interest, and in fact
the mechanism for doing so is already in place.224

Here, the Court seemed to have been shifting the focus from
contraceptive access for women to determining who should pay for
contraceptives. Indeed, in the dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, termed the “let the
government pay” solution as unworkable. Ginsburg poses the
following questions:
And where is the stopping point to the ‘let the government pay’
alternative? Suppose an employer’s sincerely held religious belief
is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the
minimum wage . . . or according women equal pay for sub222. Id. at 2769-72.
223. Id. at 2780 (“We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free
access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within
the meaning of RFRA, and we will proceed to consider the final prong
of the RFRA test, i.e., whether HHS has shown that the contraceptive
mandate is ‘the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.’”) (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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stantially similar work . . . . Does it rank as a less restrictive
alternative to require the government to provide the money or
benefit to which the employer has a religion-based objection?225

Whether the Court’s decision is pragmatic or unprincipled will be
analyzed and debated for years to come. For the public health
community, there are several points to ponder.
First, although this case involved small, closely held corporations,
the impact on public health policy carries national implications. For
example, it is unclear how this ruling will affect the contraception
needs of female employees of large publicly held corporations. Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent notes that “[t]he Court’s determination that
RFRA extends to for profit corporations is bound to have untoward
effects. Although the Court attempts to cabin its language to closely
held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public
or private.”226 In responding to this argument initially raised by HHS,
the Court glosses over this point by simply stating that, “[t]hese
cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it
seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers
will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed to any example
of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous
practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring”227
However, just because corporate giants have not asserted RFRA
claims against public health mandates, does not necessarily mean that
they are unlikely to, or even will not assert the claims. As Chief
Justice Roberts noted while upholding the ACA in 2012, “[l]egislative
novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything.”228
Second, and most important to public health, the Court went to
great lengths to limit its ruling to the mandate while apparently
shielding other public health activities from similar RFRA challenges.
In perhaps one of the few safe harbors for public health, the Court
notes:
Our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the
contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be understood
to hold that an insurance coverage mandate must necessarily
fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs. Other
coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be
supported by different interests (for example, the need to
combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve
225. Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2774.
228. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).
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different arguments about the least restrictive means of
providing them.229

But this may be of little comfort to the public health community.
Some commentators have remarked that “in the wake of [Burwell]
v. Hobby Lobby, we may anticipate challenges to other medical
services that some religions find objectionable, such as vaccinations,
infertility treatments, blood transfusions, certain psychiatric
treatments, and even hospice care.”230
Finally, public health practitioners will take comfort from the fact
that the Court’s decision was purely a statutory interpretation and
did not reach any First Amendment claims.231 But this comfort may
be short lived since it is likely that the same reasoning can be
extended to the First Amendment.
The broader public policy implications of the Hobby Lobby
decision on other areas of public health and healthcare in general, still
remain to be seen. For example, although Justice Alito noted that the
decision “[c]oncerns only the contraceptive mandate and should not be
understood to hold that all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for
vaccinations or blood transfusions, must necessarily fall if they
conflict with an employer’s religious beliefs. Nor does it provide a
shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination as a
religious practice,”232 one may wonder if this means that vaccination
programs are safe from RFRA challenges for now. Additionally, how
many other employers would test and indeed implement the newly
declared religious rights? Finally, would the newly declared religious
rights have any impacts on the exemptions for isolation and
quarantine?

IV. Isolation and Quarantine: Implications for Public
Health Practice
Isolation refers to the separation of ill persons who have a
communicable disease from those who are healthy,233 whereas
229. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2783.
230. Cohen et al., supra note 297, at 598.
231. See Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2785 (noting that “[t]he contraceptive
mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our
decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the
First Amendment claim raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.”).
232. Id. at 2758.
233. Christopher Ogolla, Non-Criminal Habeas Corpus for Quarantine and
Isolation Detainees: Serving the Private Right or Violating Public
Policy?, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 135, 139 (2011).
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quarantine “is used to separate and restrict the movement of well
persons who may have been exposed to a communicable disease to see
if they become ill.”234 Generally, the literature is bereft of cases where
states have applied religious exemptions to quarantine and isolation.235
This is largely due to the fact that “public health quarantine and
isolation are legal authorities that may be, but rarely are,
implemented to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.”236
Nevertheless, some state statutes contain language that appears to
grant religious exemptions. For example, a North Dakota statute
provides in relevant part that “to the extent possible, cultural and
religious beliefs must be considered in addressing the needs of
individuals and establishing and maintaining isolation and quarantine
premises.”237 Similarly, the Oregon Revised Statutes provide that
“cultural and religious beliefs should be considered to the extent
practicable in addressing the needs of persons who are isolated or
quarantined and in establishing and maintaining premises used for
isolation or quarantine,”238 and that “ [i]solation or quarantine shall
not abridge the right of any person to rely exclusively on spiritual
means to treat a communicable disease or possibly communicable
disease in accordance with religious or other spiritual tenets and
practices.”239 Similar language about sensitivity to one’s religious
234. Id.
235. See Jeffrey Addicott, Bioterrorism: Examining American Legal and
Policy Readiness, NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY SERIES:
MEDICAL RESPONSE TO TERROR THREATS 14 (A. Richman et al., eds.,
2010) (noting that “[t]he case law regarding the quarantine of
individuals is sparse because the United States has yet to face mass
quarantine due to the spread of an epidemic, pandemic or bioterrorist
attack.”).
236. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION
STATUTES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-andisolation-statutes.aspx (last visited August 26, 2014).
237. Communicable Disease Confinement Procedure, N.D. CENT. CODE § 2307.6-02(h) (West 2013).
238. Conditions of and Principles for Isolation or Quarantine, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 433.128 (9) (West 2014).
239. Id. § 433.128 (10)(a). Additionally, sub section (b) of the statute
provides
that
“[n]othing
in
Or.
Rev.
Stat.
433.126 to 433.138, 433.142 and 433.466 prohibits a person who relies
exclusively on spiritual means to treat a communicable disease or
possibly communicable disease and who is infected with a communicable
disease or has been exposed to a toxic substance from being isolated or
quarantined in a private place of the person’s own choice, provided the
private place is approved by the Public Health Director or the local
health administrator and the person who is isolated or quarantined
complies with all laws, rules and regulations governing control,
sanitation, isolation and quarantine.” Id. § 433.128 (10)(b).
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beliefs in times of isolation and quarantine applies to Connecticut,240
Massachusetts,241 Hawaii,242 South Carolina,243 and Washington
State,244 to mention but a few. California provides a religious
exemption for examination or inspection of any person who depends
exclusively on prayer for healing in accordance with the teachings of
any recognized religious sect. The exemption does not cover
compulsory reporting of communicable diseases and isolation and
quarantine where there is probable cause to suspect that the person is
infected with the disease in a communicable stage.245 Rhode Island
offers quarantine and isolation as an alternative to those who may be
opposed to or unwilling, for reasons of health, religion, and conscience,
to undergo immunization or treatment.246 On the other hand, states
like Colorado,247 New Jersey,248 and North Carolina,249 provide no
religious exemptions for quarantine and isolation.
240. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-131(b)(9) (2014) (providing that “to the extent
possible, cultural and religious beliefs shall be considered in addressing
the needs of individuals and establishing and maintaining premises used
for quarantine and isolation.”).
241. 105 MASS. CODE. REGS. 300.210 (H)(1)(c) (2014) (noting that “[t]o the
extent possible, cultural and religious beliefs and existing disabilities
shall be considered in addressing the needs of individuals.”).
242. HAW. REV. STATS. § 325-8 (West 2014).
243. Emergency Health Powers, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-530(B)(8) (2013)
(stating that “to the extent possible, cultural and religious beliefs must
be considered in addressing the needs of the individuals and establishing
and maintaining isolation and quarantine premises.”).
244. Conditions and Principles for Isolation or Quarantine, WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 246-100-045 (9) (noting that “isolation or quarantine shall not
abridge the right of any person to rely exclusively on spiritual means
alone through prayer to treat a communicable or possibly communicable
disease in accordance with religious tenets and practices, nor shall
anything in this chapter be deemed to prohibit a person so relying who
is infected with a contagious or communicable disease from being
isolated or quarantined in a private place of his or her own choice,
provided, it is approved by the local health officer, and all laws, rules
and regulations governing control, sanitation, isolation and quarantine
are complied with. At his or her sole discretion, the local health officer
may isolate infected individuals declining treatment for the duration of
their communicable infection.”).
245. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121370 (West 2014).
246. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-8-4 (West 2014).
247. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-506 (3) (2014) (providing that “[a]ny person
who depends exclusively on prayer for healing in accordance with the
teachings of any well-recognized religious sect, denomination, or
organization, and claims exemptions on such grounds, shall nevertheless
be subject to examination, and the provisions of this part 5 regarding
compulsory reporting of communicable diseases and isolations shall
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What these divergent state practices demonstrate is that the laws
and regulations regarding religious exemptions in quarantine and
isolation depend on whether a public health emergency has been
declared. Whereas this is not necessarily a bad thing, these
exemptions, I argue, do not bode well for public health.
A significant problem with religious exemptions in quarantine and
isolation is that they seem antithetical to science. For example, both
the laws of Oregon and Washington provide that isolation or
quarantine shall not abridge the right of any person to rely
exclusively on spiritual means to treat a communicable disease “from
being isolated or quarantined in a private place of the person’s own
choice, provided, it is approved by the local health officer, and all
laws, rules and regulations governing control, sanitation, isolation and
quarantine are complied with.”250 It is hard to envision, from a public
health or a biomedical standpoint how a quarantinable communicable
disease can be treated “exclusively” by spiritual means. This is not an
attack on anyone’s religion or sincere belief on treatment, rather, it is
an acknowledgment that treatment of quarantinable communicable
diseases requires much more than spiritual means. For example,
according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, isolation
and quarantine are authorized for cholera, diphtheria, infectious
tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers,

apply where there is probable cause to suspect that such person has
active tuberculosis. Such person shall not be required to submit to any
medical treatment or to go to or be confined in a hospital or other
medical institution if the person can safely be isolated in the person’s
own home or other suitable place of the person’s choice.”).
248. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4A-12 (2014) (providing in pertinent part that
“[a]ny person who indicates that he subscribes to the art of healing by
prayer as practiced by any well recognized religious denomination, the
principles of which are opposed to medical treatment, shall not be
required to submit to medical treatment unless he, or his parent,
guardian or person standing in loco parentis, consents . . . . Any such
person, however, shall be subject to all rules and regulations with
reference to quarantine and isolation in case of contagious or infectious
diseases and subject to physical restraint in case of emergency or
violence.”).
249. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.12 (3)(e) (2014) (providing in pertinent
part that the Division of Emergency Management shall have the powers
and duties as delegated by the Governor and Secretary of Public Safety
to coordinate with the State Health Director to amend or revise the
North Carolina Emergency Operations Plan regarding public health
matters to provide for the appropriate conditions for quarantine and
isolation in order to prevent further transmission of disease).
250. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-045; OR. REV. STAT. § 433.128 (10)(b).
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severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and flu that can cause a
pandemic.251 Is it practical to treat any of these diseases spiritually?
I acknowledge that this is a difficult question to ask and
potentially a very divisive one. With reference to science and faith
healing, one commentator captures the familiar arguments used to
support religious accommodations in health, noting:
According to the substantive view, the privileging of science
over
faith
constitutes
unacceptable
discrimination against religion. In order, therefore, to achieve
substantive equality for religion, faith has to be put
on a presumptively equal footing with the methods and insight
of science. One committed to substantive equality for religion
would ask whether, for some families, prayer and/or other
spiritual healing techniques function equivalently to
conventional medicine in the family life of others. If those who
use doctors rather than prayer in the effort to heal their ailing
children are presumptively not neglectful, or culpable if the
children are not cured, should not those who use prayer instead
of conventional medicine be equally immune to charges of
neglect or assertions of culpability?252

A detailed comparison of efficacy of biomedicine and faith healing
is beyond the scope of this paper.253 Suffice it to say that religion has,
and does continue to play both a positive and negative role in
population health. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that there is no
contemporary evidence tending to show that any of the quarantinable
diseases have been successfully treated spiritually. 254
251. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR
ISOLATION
AND
QUARANTINE
1
(2014),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolatio
n.html.
252. Ira. C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA L. REV.
555, 584 (1991).
253. See generally Kaja Finkler, Sacred Healing and Biomedicine, 8 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 178 (1994) (addressing similarities and differences
between sacred healing and biomedicine); Sipco J. Vellenga, Longing for
Health: A Practice of Religious Healing and Biomedicine Compared, 47
J. RELIGIOUS HEALTH, 326, 326-37 (2008) (arguing that biomedicine and
faith healing have at least five principles in common); and Levin, supra
note 3, at 3 (noting that “there is considerable evidence that one’s
religious life has something significant to say about one’s mental
health.”).
254. To be fair, this writer is cognizant of some passages in religious texts
attesting to religious healing of those afflicted with plague, leprosy, and
perhaps tuberculosis. In the Old Testament for example, Aaron stopped
a plague that had killed 14,700 people, Numbers 16:46-50 (King James);
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V. BALANCING PUBLIC SAFETY AND PERSONAL CHOICE
OR RELIGION GONE TOO FAR?
Whenever questions arise about balancing individual liberties like
freedom of religion, against public health, welfare, and safety laws and
regulations, each side digs in and proclaims its view to be the right
one. One group ostensibly argues for complete accommodation to
religious liberty;255 others (including this writer) argue for great
deference to public health authorities;256 and yet others try to find a
middle ground.257 My view is that, in times of an epidemic or a
The Qu’ran mentions Jesus healing lepers and the blind, Surah 3. Al
‘lmran 49. That having been said, this writer is unaware of
contemporary evidence of treatment.
255. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 (1992) (“[T]he freedom of citizens to exercise their
faith should not depend on the vagaries of democratic politics, even if
expressed through laws of general applicability.”); and Smith, supra
note 18, at 266 (“[W]hether the nation’s long standing commitment to
special protection for religious freedom should now be discarded presents
a major historic decision that is likely to become even more
conspicuously contested in coming years.”).
256. This writer’s view is in accord with several cases and legal
commentators, e.g. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 222 (Miss. 1979)
(noting that many courts at various levels have determined that there is
no constitutional right to a religious or philosophical exemption when it
comes to public health issues); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (“[T]he right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or
the latter to ill health or death.”); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1987) (“However much we might
wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it
were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”);
Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990) (suggesting that
accommodations are troublesome for reasons that transcend the likely
violence they will inflict upon equality of religious liberty. If political
entities may make religion-specific policies even when not so required by
the Constitution, a number of unappealing consequences may follow);
and Alan Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a
Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 24 (2014) (“But
the mandate controversy is more Taliban than Torquemada. It has more
to do with religious employers foisting their religion on female employees
than with government foisting its secular values on religious
employers.”).
257. See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally
Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 626 (2002) (writing that
“[p]ublic health officials are explicitly directed to respect individual
religious objections to vaccinations and treatment. Officials must follow
specified legal standards before using isolation or quarantine, which are
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pandemic, public health cannot afford the luxury of debating which
viewpoint, between public safety and personal choice, should prevail.
Critics may argue, with some force, that the case for individual
liberty in public health is compelling because the U.S. Supreme Court
has long held that a competent person has a constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment.258 Point well taken. I submit, however, that
isolation and quarantine are tools to prevent ill persons from
spreading the disease to the population. It is no longer about an
individual’s choice for treatment. It is about protecting the “herd”
from a dangerous disease. As the U.S. Supreme Court so aptly put it
in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “the right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the
child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”259
Yes, we can have the debate about what process is due to those who
are quarantined or isolated. That is entirely appropriate. But
automatically granting religious exemptions in quarantine and
isolation cases as some of the states have done does a disservice to
public health.
Furthermore, granting religious exemptions in quarantine and
isolation cases arguably runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
Courts have so far not been presented with such a challenge, except
in Moore v. Draper.260 In Moore, the petitioner was confined in the
Southwest Florida State Sanitarium at Tampa under the provisions of
a Florida statute relating to compulsory isolation and hospitalization
of tubercular persons. 261 The court mentioned that the “[p]etitioner
makes a special attack upon the law on the ground that it
discriminates against all persons other than those of a certain religious
faith and belief.”262 The court found that “Section 392.23, Subsection
(2), F.S.A. is sufficient protection and guarantee that [petitioner’s]
religious freedom is not being denied to him. Religious freedom cannot
be used as a cloak for any person with a contagious or infectious
disease to spread such disease because of his religion.”263 Although this
decision neither discusses the statute in question nor the

authorized only to prevent the transmission of contagious diseases to
others and must be by the least restrictive means available.”).
258. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
259. 321 U.S. at 166.
260. 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
261. F.S.A. § 392.23(2), repealed by Laws 1951, c. 26828, § 14.
262. 57 So. 2d at 650.
263. Id.

301

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
The Public Health Implications of Religious Exemptions: A Balance
Between Public Safety and Personal Choice, or Religion Gone Too Far?

discrimination issue raised by the petitioner, it raises the possibility
that such a challenge is possible.264
Finally, others may contend that denying religious exemptions to
quarantined and isolated individuals may violate federal laws,
particularly RFRA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. The answer is hard to predict. However,
quarantine and isolation measures can conform to RFRA, even
though the measures may substantially burden an individual’s
religious conscience. All that RFRA requires is that if the
government’s action substantially burdens a person’s religion, then
the government must “[demonstrate] that application of the burden to
the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”265
In light of the foregoing discussion, I am persuaded that
overwhelming number of states providing statutory religious
exemptions for immunizations, and those that provide religious
exemptions for contraception, quarantine and isolation, are tipping
the balance heavily in favor of religion. To be fair, public health
concerns do not necessarily trump religious rights in the view of some.
Thus, they would rather see public health suffer than impinge on any
one’s religious rights. This approach is however, proving to be
detrimental to public health, which in turn then ends up hurting the
same individuals whose religious rights the states are trying to
accommodate. Therein lies the conundrum.

VI. Suggested Approaches
Providing recommendations for or against religious exemptions in
public health is an exceedingly difficult task. In the words of one
commentator, “[t]he United States has a romantic attitude towards
religious individuals and institutions, as though they are always
right.”266 Therefore, any argument for or against religious
accommodations in health engenders charged and often passionate
Nevertheless
many
commentators
have
made
defenses.267
264. See, e.g., Alicia Novak, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to
State-Compelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, 1115 (2005) (citing cases where state vaccination
exemption statutes were found to violate the equal protection clause).
265. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb–1(b) (2012).
266. HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 3.
267. Compare Editorial, supra note 195 (noting that “allowing religious
doctrine to prevail over the need for competent emergency care and a
woman’s right to complete and accurate information about her condition
and treatment choices violates medical ethics and existing law.”) with
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recommendations ranging from a complete abolition of state religious
exemptions,268 to reaching for a more optimal balance between
religious freedom and public health,269 to complete accommodation of
religious exemptions by the states.270 It seems to me that these
recommendations have either been ignored or have been palpably
unpersuasive to many state legislatures. So where do we go from here?
Notwithstanding some of the recommendations already offered, there
are two approaches that have not been discussed extensively in the
literature and yet are germane to public health. The first is that state
lawmakers should be encouraged to apply evidence-based law,271 just
like public health practitioners and physicians apply the principles of
evidence-based medicine in their work. “Evidence-based medicine
(EBM) [is] defined as the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of
current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual
patients.”272 Likewise, evidence-based law relies on the best available
scientific evidence and data by lawmakers as a basis for lawmaking.
Unfortunately, state legislators are inclined to rely on anecdotal
evidence and common wisdom unsupported by scientific research.273
For example, despite studies showing the disadvantages of religious
exemptions in public health, forty-eight states statutorily provide for
religious exemptions for school vaccination laws,274 while twenty-one
states offer exemptions from contraceptive coverage, usually for

Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 497 (2010) (stating that “[f]inally and
most importantly, we must work harder to convince people why
religious liberty is worth protecting. Without that understanding,
legislators will never vote for RFRAs. Without that understanding,
judges will hesitate to interpret them fairly. Without that
understanding, religious liberty will soon become a second-class right,
relegated to theory and to memory. We should fight that at all costs.”).
268. Novak, supra note 264, at 1125.
269. Timothy Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization
Statutes: Reaching for a More Optimal Balance Between Religious
Freedom and Public Health, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109, 132 (1997).
270. Smith, supra note 18, at 266.
271. See generally Jeffrey Rachlinski, Comment, Evidence Based Law, 96
CORNELL. L. REV. 901 (2011) (noting that the point of evidence based
law is to create better law—law informed by reality).
272. Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts
Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L.
327, 327 (2001).
273. Shai Wozner, Comment, Evidence Based Law by Jeffrey Rachlinski, 96
CORNELL. L. REV. 925, 926 (2011).
274. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 31.
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religious reasons, for insurers or employers in their policies.275 A few
state statutes contain language that appears to grant religious
exemptions for quarantine and isolation detainees.276 This underscores
the point that scientific evidence, or empiricism, is lacking in the law.
As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has noted, legal empiricism has
remained in the scholarly academies and has not assumed a similar
presence in the field of legal practice or rulemaking (e.g., legislatures
and courts).277 This has been and will continue to be harmful to public
health.
The second approach for public health is to find insiderchampions. Public health needs innovative leaders who are willing to
challenge the status quo. Three such persons merit mentioning here.
First is the former mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg.
Professor Lawrence Gostin has written that the public health
community views Bloomberg “as an urban innovator—a rare political
and business leader willing to fight for a built environment conducive
to healthier, safer lifestyles.”278 Bloomberg “has used the engine of
government to make New York City a laboratory for innovation—
raising the visibility of public health, testing policy effectiveness, and
probing the boundaries of state power.”279 Even though some of his
policies were struck down by the courts,280 Bloomberg has proved to
be an insider-champion for public health in ways that have changed
public health forever.
The second insider-champion is former surgeon general C. Everett
Koop. According to the Washington Post, “Koop is justly renowned
for his role in the tobacco wars of the 1990s. His repeated warnings
that tobacco use was deadly and increasing among children anchored
a series of famous congressional hearings that led to warning labels,
bans on Joe Camel-type advertising and finally, in 2009, the FDA’s
regulation of tobacco.”281 Additionally, Koop’s role in the fight against
HIV/AIDS is legendary. The Washington Post notes:
275. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 32.
276. See infra Part IV.
277. Wozner, supra note 273.
278. Lawrence Gostin, Bloomberg’s Health Legacy—Urban Innovator or
Meddling Nanny?, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 19, 19 (2013).
279. Id.
280. See Matter of N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
v. N.Y. City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (2014)
(holding that that the New York City Board of Health, in adopting the
Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule, exceeded the scope of its regulatory
authority).
281. Joshua Green, Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop: An Unsung
Hero in the Fight Against AIDS, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2013,
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Koop was a noted social conservative who disapproved of
homosexuality. But as a doctor, he recognized the
epidemiological implications of what was happening and fought
tirelessly to contain them. Whenever he testified before
Congress, he knocked down the conservative talking point that
“AIDS is not a no-fault disease.” He labored to disabuse
Republicans . . . of their crackpot conviction that AIDS spread
through spores and could be transmitted by spoons and scissors.
He intentionally highlighted the tragedies of pediatric AIDS and
hemophiliacs like Ryan White who contracted the disease
through transfusions to shape public consciousness of AIDS as
affecting more than gay men and intravenous drug users.
Ultimately, this strategy yielded landmark legislation, the Ryan
White CARE Act. 282

Thus, Koop’s efforts helped shift public awareness in a way that
made legislation possible. 283
Finally, a third insider-champion is Bill Gates acting through the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Foundation is “an enormous
funder of biomedical research that has quickly rearranged
the public health universe.”284 The Foundation applies science and
technology to address the most severe health problems in the
developing world,285 including HIV/AIDs, malaria, and tuberculosis. It
has also funded vaccine delivery programs thereby saving millions of
lives a year.286 But more important to this discussion is the
Foundation’s support of evidence-based decision-making. The
Foundation invests in providing reliable information and analysis to
help health officials review new vaccines and thereby speed up their
decision-making. 287
I acknowledge here that others may quibble with the second
approach as a departure from the central thesis of the paper regarding
religious exemptions. To some extent, I am willing to concede that
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/27/form
er-surgeon-general-everett-koop-an-unsung-hero-in-the-fight-againstaids/.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. Peter Lee, Towards a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, WIS. L.
REV. 917, 969 (2009) (citations omitted).
285. Id.
286. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., VACCINE DELIVERY STRATEGY
OVERVIEW,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/GlobalDevelopment/Vaccine-Delivery (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
287. See id.
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point. However, the suggested approach centers on individuals who
have focused on protection of entire populations, rather than personal
autonomy or individual rights. I mention these three champions
because they have shown a penchant for relying on scientific evidence
to formulate public health policy and programs. In so doing, they
have gone against dogma and become innovators. These are the
insider-champions who can confront state laws on religious
exemptions and legislators and make a difference on what is written
into public health laws and how the laws are implemented.

Conclusion
This paper started by asking three questions: First, do religious
exemptions in public health activities allow the government to unduly
prefer religion over non-religion? Second, is immunizing religious
conduct from scrutiny consistent with public welfare, health, and
safety? Third, is the overwhelming number of states (forty-eight)
providing statutory religious exemptions for immunizations and nearly
half that provide exemptions for contraception, tipping the balance
heavily in favor of religion?
The answer to the first question is a qualified yes. For example, in
McCarthy v. Boozman,288 a parent challenged the Arkansas statute
requiring the vaccination of all school children. The statute provided
a religious exemption to members of a recognized church or religious
denomination.289 In finding the religious exemption unconstitutional,
the court noted that “the preferential restriction contained in
Arkansas’
religious
exemption
provision
contravenes
the
Establishment Clause’s principles of governmental neutrality,”290 that
the exemption failed to satisfy the commands of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, and also violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.291 But this question
is qualified by the fact that the exemptions have been held to be valid
in general. Legislatures can choose to grant exemptions, but the
constitution does not require them.292 So, although legislatures may
grant exemptions, they must not favor some religion unfairly over
others.293

288. McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002).
289. Id. at 950.
290. Id. at 949.
291. Id.
292. GREENWALT, supra note 33, at 31.
293. Id.
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As for the second question, regarding whether immunizing
religious conduct is consistent with public welfare, health, and safety,
the answer seems to be no. The studies cited in Part II (A)(2) herein
show that religious exemptions place public health at a risk. Finally,
regarding the third question, I am persuaded that the overwhelming
number of states providing statutory religious exemptions for
immunizations and the nearly half that provide exemptions for
contraception are responsible for tipping the balance heavily in favor
of religion.
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